## SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLDERBLA 2 53 PM '95 TAX DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA TAX DIVISION

DAVID B. MCMILLEN

:

Petitioner,

v.

Tax Docket No. 6259-94

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER PART OF COURT'S ORDER

The District of Columbia (the "District") asks this Court to reconsider its Order dated January 27, 1995, whereby this Court provided, inter alia, that "petitioners have 30 days from the date of this Order to file an Opposition to respondent's Motion to Dismiss and/or file a Motion for Leave to Amend...." The District contends that the relief to allow Petitioner to file a Motion for Leave to Amend, and presumably, an amended petition will not remedy the jurisdictional problem. Petitioner will incur an additional motion filing fee, and the petition will remain in the same legal posture, that is, without subject matter jurisdiction.

The issue of subject matter jurisdiction is insurmountable and incurable given these facts and the appellate court decisions directly on point. In <u>George Hyman Construction v. District of Columbia</u>, 315 A.2d 175, 176 (D.C. 1974), the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's determination that it lacked the authority to hear the merits of the matter because there was no subject matter jurisdiction. In <u>Hyman</u>, the trial court found no

jurisdiction "because the taxpayer had only paid the first half of the annual assessment of its real estate taxes for the pertinent taxable year before filing its petition in Superior Court.... This also was before the time expired within which [petitioner] could have filed its petition. George Hyman Construction v. D.C., supra, 315 A2d. at 176 (double underlined emphasis supplied). The trial court concluded, and the appellate court affirmed that "taxpayers must "pay all of the challenged taxes levied for the entire fiscal year in question prior to the time their appeal was filed." George Hyman Construction v. D.C., supra, 315 A2d. at 176 (double underlined emphasis supplied) citing Berenter v. District of Columbia, 466 F.2d 367, 374 (1972). The appellate court noted the harsh result of dismissal but affirmed its unavoidability given the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The law is clear and absolute. The payment of taxes must precede timely filings. D.C. Code §47-3303 (1981). This Court is without legal authority to hear a tax assessment appeal if the taxpayer fails to pay the taxes <u>prior</u> to filing a petition. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction is beyond the discretionary authority of this Court. This Court must dismiss this petition. even if amended, because subject matter jurisdiction is still lacking.

The timing requirements of the tax appeal statute is a jurisdictional element that the taxpayer must also meet. An amendment to the petition can not cure the lack of subject matter jurisdiction that results from a failure to conform to the

In <u>Customer Parking</u>, <u>Inc. v. District of Columbia</u>, 562 A.2d 651, 654 (D.C. 1989), the appellate court affirmed the (effective) dismissal of the petition to appeal an assessment because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court in <u>Customer Parking</u>, <u>Inc.</u> followed the established rule that "the timing imperatives for appeals of tax assessments are not merely statutes of limitation that may be waived, but are jurisdictional requirements that cannot be waived." <u>Customer Parking</u>, <u>Inc. v. District of Columbia</u>, <u>supra</u>, 562 A.2d at 654. With respect to the timing element of D.C. Code §47-825.1, (41 D.C. Reg. No. 14, page 1824 (Friday, April 8, 1994)), the court has long held that this section is jurisdictional, and it has concluded that "<u>failure to file within the six-month period or failure to pay the tax,</u>

subject matter jurisdiction was lacking.) (emphasis added);

National Graduate University v. District of Columbia. 346 A.2d 740.

743 (The Court found that "the limitation period in the [tax appeal] statute...is jurisdictional in nature and not merely a statue of limitations").

penalties.

In this case, the Court's Order permits Petitioner leave to amend an incurably defective petition. Such a petition, if amended, remains fatally flawed. Actions to challenge assessments

statutory requirement to file within the prescribed time limits. In <u>Customer Parking</u>, <u>Inc. v. District of Columbia</u>, 562 A.2d 651, 654 (D.C. 1989), the appellate court affirmed the (effective) dismissal of the petition to appeal an assessment because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court in Customer Parking, Inc. followed the established rule that "the timing imperatives for appeals of tax assessments are not merely statutes of limitation that may be waived, but are jurisdictional requirements that cannot be waived." Customer Parking, Inc. v. District of Columbia, supra, 562 A.2d at 654. With respect to the timing element of D.C. Code §47-825.1, (41 D.C. Reg. No. 14, page 1824 (Friday, April 8, 1994)), the court has long held that this section is jurisdictional, and it has concluded that "failure to file within the six-month period or failure to pay the tax, penalties, and interest due deprives the Superior Court of jurisdiction to consider the taxpayer's appeal." First Interstate v. District of Columbia, 604 A.2d 10, 11 (D.C.App. 1992) (The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the petition because subject matter jurisdiction was lacking.) (emphasis National Graduate University v. District of Columbia, 346 A.2d 740 743 (The Court found that "the limitation period in the [tax appeal] statute...is jurisdictional in nature and not merely a statue of limitations").

In this case, the Court's Order permits Petitioner leave to amend an incurably defective petition. Such a petition, if amended, remains fatally flawed. Actions to challenge assessments

are in the nature of request for refunds. Yet, an amended petition would precede the payment of taxes. Petitioner may have not even received his 1995 tax bill. Petitioner's payment of the tax installments are not likely to occur before March 31, 1995, and September 30, 1995. An amended petition would relate to the date of the initial filing date of September 30, 1994, which clearly predates the prescribed filing period from March 31, 1995 to September 30, 1995.

Petitioner's only remedy is to start again to attain subject matter jurisdiction. Fortunately, they have filed prematurely rather than tardily. Petitioner may challenge his tax assessment for Tax Year 1995. He must first pay his taxes, and then, file a new petition with this Court between March 31, 1995 and September 30, 1995, inclusively. Absent following the statutory scheme, there is no subject matter jurisdiction, and this Court lacks authority to take cognizance of the tax assessment appeal.

WHEREFORE, the District asks this Court to reconsider and modify its Order which permits, <u>inter alia</u>, the filing of a Motion for Leave to Amend the petition on the basis that there is no subject matter jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,

GARLAND PINKSTON Acting Corporation Counsel, D.C.

CLAUDE BAILEY
Deputy Corporation Counsel, D.C.
Economic Development Division

JULIA L. SAYLES Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C. Chief, Finance Section

MELBRA J. GILES #434056

Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C.

441 4th Street, N.W., 6th Floor Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 727-6240

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of Respondent's Motion to Reconsider Part of Order was mailed postage prepaid, on this day of February, 1995, to David McMillen, 418 D Street, SE, Washington, D.C. 20003.

Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C.

DAVID B. MCMILLEN	: :
Petitioner,	: :
v.	: Tax Docket No. 6259-94
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,	•
Respondent.	: :

#### **ORDER**

Upon consideration of Respondent's Motion to Reconsider Part of the Court's Order, and good cause having been shown, it is by the court, this \_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_ 1995,

ORDERED that this Court modifies its Order;

ORDERED that this Court will not allow Petitioner to file a Motion for Leave to Amend the petition.

JUDGE CHERYL M. LONG

Copies to:
Melbra J. Giles
Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C.
441 4th Street, N.W., 6th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20001

David B. McMillen 418 D Street, SE Washington, D.C. 20003

# SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 2 51 PM '95

DAVID B. McMILLEN

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Petitioner,

v.

: Tax Docket No. 6259-94

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Respondent.

#### ORDER

This matter came before the Court for consideration of respondent's Motion to Dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The basis of respondent's Motion to Dismiss is that petitioner failed to pay his real property taxes for Tax Year 1995 prior to filing his petition, and that petitioner filed prematurely its appeal of the real property assessment.

Petitioners have failed to file any pleadings in Opposition to respondent's Motion to Dismiss.

WHEREFORE, it is by the Court this day of January, 1995
ORDERED that petitioners have 30 days from the date of this
Order to file an Opposition to respondent's Motion to Dismiss
and/or file a Motion for Leave to Amend; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that this matter will be dismissed if petitioners fail to file the required pleadings as set forth above within 30 days of this Order.

Cheryl My Long

Judge

## Copies mailed to:

Melba Giles Assistant Corporation Counsel 441 4th Street, N.W. 6th Floor Washington, D.C. 20001

David B. McMillen 418 D Street, S.E. Washington D.C. 20003

DAVID B. MCMILLEN	: :
Petitioner,	: :
v.	Tax Docket No. 6259-94
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,	:
Respondent.	

#### <u>ORDER</u>

Upon consideration of Respondent's motion to dismiss, and Petitioner's response thereto, good cause having been shown, it is by the court, this \_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_ 1994,

ORDERED that Respondent's motion to dismiss is granted.

JUDGE

Copies to:
Melbra J. Giles
Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C.
441 4th Street, N.W., 6th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20001

David B. McMillen 418 D Street, SE Washington, D.C. 20003

DAVID B. MCMILLEN

Petitioner,

v.

Tax Docket No. 6259-94

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Respondent.

## RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

The District of Columbia moves to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that petitioner has filed prematurely its appeal of the real property assessment and has failed to pay the full amount of the real property taxes for Tax Year 1995. Respondent relies on Super. Ct. Tax R. 3 and 9, D.C. Code §§47-825.1 and 47-3303, and applicable case law. Respondent requests that the Court grant its motion for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

Respectfully submitted,

ERIAS A. HYMAN Acting Corporation Counsel, D.C

JAMES RANDALL Acting Deputy Corporation Counsel, D.C. Economic Development Division

JULIA L. SAYLES
Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C.
Chief, Finance Section,

By: JUMN JM MELBRA J. GILES #431056

Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C.

441 4th Street, N.W., 6th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 727-6240

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DAVID B. MCMILLEN

:

Petitioner,

v.

Tax Docket No. 6259-94

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Respondent.

action actions.

## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondent, by and through counsel, moves this Court, pursuant to Super. Ct. Tax R. 3 and 9, to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the following reasons:

On September 30 1994, Petitioner filed a petition with this Court. He seeks to challenge the Tax Year 1995 assessment of his real property which is located at 418 D Street, SE, Washington, D.C., Square 820 and Lot 32. Petitioner asserted that the period from October 1, 1994 to September 30, 1995 is at issue and appealed the 1995 assessment with the Board of Real Property Assessments and Appeals. The 1995 real property taxes are unpaid.

Respondent contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to allow this suit to progress. Petitioner has filed the petition prematurely. Also, he has yet to pay the real property taxes due March 31, 1995 and September 15, 1995, for the 1995 Tax Year.

A party or the court, <u>sua sponte</u>, may raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. <u>Customers Parking Inc. v.</u>

District of Columbia, 562 A.2d 651, 654 (D.C.App. 1989). Respondent recognizes that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear the petitions for review of tax assessments. However, in this case, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Respondent asserts that Petitioners have failed to comply with the statutory remedy to appeal an assessment, thus depriving the Court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case on the merits.

The applicable law is explicit regarding the period within which a party, aggrieved by a real estate tax assessment, may appeal to this Court. Further, the law clearly requires that taxpayers pay all taxes prior to filing an appeal of their assessments with this Court. The language, which governs real estate tax assessment appeals, states:

"...within 6 months after March 30th following the calendar year in which a real property assessment, equalization, or valuation was made, any taxpayer aggrieved by a real property assessment, equalization or valuation may appeal the real property assessment, equalization or valuation in the same manner and to the same extent as provided in [§47-3303], provided that the taxpayer shall have first appealed the assessment, equalization or valuation to the Board...."

D.C. Code § 47-825.1(j) (Supp. 1994). The proviso found in §47-3303 reads that "...such person shall first pay such tax together with penalties and interest due thereon to the D.C. Treasurer."

D.C. Code §47-3303 (1990).

This premature petition deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Section 47.825.1(j) has been interpreted as a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Tax Division of the Superior Court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from and petitions for review of assessments of tax made by the District of Columbia. D.C. Code §11-1201 (1990).

jurisdictional prerequisite. George Hyman Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 315 A.2d 175, 178 (D.C.App. 1974); First Interstate Credit Alliance, Inc., 604 A.2d 10, 11 (D.C.App. 1992). The timing to appeal tax assessments are jurisdictional limitations as well as statutes of limitations. First Interstate v. District of Columbia, 604 A.2d at 11; Customers Parking, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 562 A.2d at 654 citing National Graduate University v. District of Columbia, 346 A.2d 740, 743 (D.C. 1975). Subject matter jurisdiction does not attach to the Court until the time comes to challenge the appeal. Pursuant to §47-825.1, a taxpayer may file an appeal of an assessment no sooner than the 30th day of March following the calendar year in which a real property assessment is made.

In this case, the statute allows the aggrieved taxpayers to sue up to six months after March 30th of the following calendar year in which the assessors valued the property. Petitioner expressly states that he is challenging the assessment for the period from October 1, 1994 to September 30, 1995, which is Tax Year 1995. He may file no earlier than March 30, 1995, and no later than September 30, 1995, to challenge the real property assessment for Tax Year 1995. The petition, filed on September 30, 1994, clearly predates the filing date of March 30, 1995, of the 1995 Tax Year for which the appeal is raised. Petitioner has filed too early. For this reason, subject matter jurisdiction does not adhere.

Respondent also argues that this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction because Petitioner has yet to pay the 1995 taxes prior to the filing of the petition. D.C. Code §47-3303 is clear and unambiguous. Section 47-3303 allows an aggrieved taxpayer to sue to challenge their assessment so long as the taxpayer has paid all taxes, penalties and interest prior to filing. D.C. Code §47-3303 (1990).

Prepayment of a challenged tax a jurisdictional element too. Judicial review of an assessment does not lie until the taxes, interest, and penalties (if any) due have been paid prior to the filing of a petition. District of Columbia v. Berenter, 406 F.2d 367, 375 (D.C.App. 1972); First Interstate v. District of Columbia, 604 A.2d at 11, citing Perry v. District of Columbia, 314 A.2d 766, 767 (D.C. 1974); George Hyman Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 315 A.2d at 178. The failure to pay all challenged taxes, penalties and interest levied for the entire fiscal year prior to filing deprives the Superior Court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the taxpayer's appeal. District of Columbia v. Berenter, 406 F.2d at 375; First Interstate v. District of Columbia, 604 A.2d at 11; George Hyman Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 315 A.2d at 178; Wagshal v. District of Columbia, 430 A.2d 524, 527 (D.C. 1981) (dismissal of the taxpayer's real property assessment challenge was upheld because she filed in Superior Court one day before paying the second half tax.)

Because real estate assessment challenges are governed by the

same procedural requirements of §§47-825.1 and 47-3303,2 First <u>Interstate</u> is controlling here, even though it involved personal property taxes. The First Interstate court said §47-3303 imposed upon the taxpayer the obligation to pay all taxes due, together with interest accruing until the time of payment, before challenging a notice of tax deficiency. <u>Id.</u> at 12. First <u>Interstate</u> upheld the use of a bright line rule in interpreting the unambiguous wording of the statute as promoting judicial economy by eliminating the risk of further litigation. <u>Id.</u> at 13. Further, the court in Wagshal noted that "since taxpayers learn the amount of the assessment well in advance of the deadline for filing an appeal, it is reasonable to expect them to anticipate an appeal, and be enabled to make timely filings and tax payments." Wagshal v. District of Columbia, 430 A.2d at 527.

The court has consistently required that taxpayer pay all taxes before filing in Superior Court. Subject matter jurisdiction does not attach until this prerequisite have been satisfied, and a refund based on a final determination of the Superior Court presupposes that the taxpayer has complied with the procedure mandated by the legislature. This is precisely the issue here.

Subject matter jurisdiction underpins the statutory scheme, and Petitioners must conform with its prerequisites to appeal. In this case, Petitioner must all pay his taxes for the 1995 Tax Year.

<sup>§47-3303</sup> is the recodification of predecessor statute §47-2403. The two sections are effectively identical in requiring all taxes be paid before filing in Superior Court. The one amendment that has been made to the section dealt with how to calculate the six-month filing period, and has no effect on the payment requirement. See Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751 n. 1 (D.C. 1983).

The installment payment dates for the 1995 Tax Year are March 31, 1995, and September 15, 1995. The statute does not expressly prohibit an aggrieved taxpayer from paying prior to these dates but Council for the District of Columbia (the "Council") need not establish the tax rates before October 15th of the tax year. D.C. Code §47-812, as amended in 41 D.C. Reg. 1818, 1822, §5(a)3 (Apr. 8, 1994). In effect, Petitioners are unable to determine the amount of his 1995 taxes until the Council sets tax rates on or before October 15, 1994, for the 1995 Tax Year, and the Department of Finance and Revenue bills Petitioner for the amount of the 1995 taxes based on those established rates. Petitioner is limited nevertheless to bring his suit between March 30, 1995, September 30, 1995, after he pays the 1995 real property taxes, and any outstanding real property taxes. Without the payment of all taxes, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal of Petitioner 1995 Tax Year assessment. This Court must dismiss this matter.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> D.C. Code §47-812(a) reads, as amended, "The Council [of the District of Columbia], after public hearing, shall by October 15 of each year establish, by act, rates of taxation, by class [of real property], ...and the rates shall be applied, during the tax year, to the assessed value of all real property subject to taxation...."

WHEREFORE, Respondent prays that this Court grant its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,

ERIAS A. HYMAN Acting Corporation Counsel, D.C.

JAMES RANDALL Acting Deputy Corporation Counsel, D.C. Economic Development Division

JULIA L. SAYLES Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C. Chief, Finance Section

By:

MELBRA J. GILES #431056

Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C. 441 4th Street, N.W., 6th Floor Washington, D.C. 20001

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 727-6240

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was mailed postage prepaid, on this 2/5 day of November, 1994, to David B. McMillen, 418 D Street, SE, Washington, D.C. 20003.

Melbra J. Giles

Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C.



# District of Columbia Courts 500 Indiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001



DAVID B. MCMILLEN	)		
Plaintiff, versus	) ) )	Docket No.	6259-94
District of Columbia Respondent	) ) )		
	,		

TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled case has been placed on the Court's Calendar for Status on 02/27/95 at 9:30 am.

If you desire, you may call (202) 879-1737, two or three days prior to the scheduled hearing to verify the number of the courtroom assigned for this proceeding.

CLERK, Superior Court of the District of Columbia

SERVED AS FOLLOWS:

DAVID B. MCMILLEN
418 D STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003

Copies to:

Assistant Corporation Counsel D.C.

Department of Finance and Revenue

#### Petition.

# THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1) (1) TAX DIVISION

David B. McMillen, Petitioner,

VS.

Docket Number <u>6259-94</u>

SUPE. DISTRICT TAX S

District of Columbia, Respondent.

#### **PETITION**

The above named petitioner appeals from an assessment of real property, and avers as follows:

- (1) The Petitioner is an individual with residence at 418 D Street, SE (Square 820, Lot 32).
- (2) The assessment in controversy is a for real property for the period October 1, 1994 to September 30, 1995 in the amount of \$228,493 (two hundred twenty-eight thousand, four hundred ninety-three dollars).
- (3) The making of a complaint to the Board of Equalization and Review was dated April 128.88 94TX6259##
- (4) The assessment is based upon the following errors: The assessment is higher than 120 0 120 00 the market value of the property.
- (5) The facts upon which the petitioner relies as the basis of this case are as  $to || to ||_{0.00}$ . The purchase price of the house and the appraisal of the house at the time of purchase 1 ITM-CT (August 30, 1993).
- (6) Wherefore, the petitioner prays that this Court may hear the case and grant the petitioner relief.

Petitioner

418 D Street, SE Address



## DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT - DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND REVENUE NOTICE OF PROPOSED REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT FOR TAX YEAR 1995



1995 REAL PROPERTY TAX YEAR IS OCTOBER 1, 1994 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1995

SQUARE	SUFFIX	LOT	NOTICE DATE			RRENT SED VAL	UE	CHANGE IN VA	LUE	PROPOSED ASSESSED VALUE*
0820	<u> </u>	0032	02/25/94		TAX	YR	1994	AMOUNT	PERCENT	TAX YR 1995
PROPERTY ADDRESS	0418 I	) ST	SE	LAND			95,524	4779-	5.0-	90,745
NEIGHBORH CODE	100D 9			BUILDING			144,995	7247~	4.9-	137,748
TYPE OF PROPERTY	011 RE	ESIDENTIA	L ROW	TOTAL			240,519	12026-	5.0-	228,493

DAVID B MCMILLEN 418 D ST SE

WASHINGTON

DC 20003

Tax Year: 1994

Current Tax Class:

02

NOTE: Tax classes may change from year to year.

\*RESULTING FROM ANNUAL REVALUATION

Important information on back. See enclosed handbook for more 144

FP-151 (Rev. 1/94)

THIS IS NOT A TAX BILL

		,		REA A	AL PROPERTAPPEAL	RECIPPIBLA GOVERNMENT
#	Square	Lot(s)	#	Square	Lot(s)	Dura Dura III
1	820	32	4			RECEIVEDITIONER: (1200, A 1119)
2			5			#.of Appeals Filed
3			6			RECIPIENT: Debia Turstalf



District of Columbia Government Board of Equalization and Review One Judiciary Square 441 4th Street, N.W., Suite 430 Washington, D.C. 20001

## REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT APPEAL

TAX	YEA	R
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SquareLot
Class
Туре
Assessor

	PRINT OR TYPE ALL ITEMS NUMBERED 1-9. AP	PPEALS MUST BE FILED NO LATER THAN APRIL 15.
1.	NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS: Name David B. McMillen Street 418 D Street, SE City Washington, DC State Zip 20003	2. NAME AND ADDRESS OF OWNER:  Name David B. McMillen  Street 418 D Street, SE  City Washington, DC  State Zip 20003
	FROM YOUR "NOTICE OF	PROPOSED ASSESSMENT"
3.	Square 820 Suffix Lot 32  Type pf Property (res., etc.) residential row  Class 01  Premise Address 418 D Street, SE  Neighborhood Code 9  Your Estimate of Value \$184,500	4. ASSESSED VALUE OF TAX YEARS  Last Year 19 94 Proposed, 19 95  Land 95,524 90,745  Building 144,995 137,748  Total 240,519 228,493
	ATTACH COPIES OF INFORMATION ON VALUE OF PROPERTY, IN	NCLUDING APPRAISALS, OFFERS TO PURCHASE, PICTURES, ETC.
5.	BASIS FOR APPEAL (Check Appropriate items)  A. □ Property Damage or Condition  B. □ Disputed Property Record  C. □ Classification — (wrong tax class)  D. □ Equalization — (higher or lower than other properties of same size and type)  E. □ Valuation — (more than 5% higher or lower than correct market value)	6. PROPERTY VALUE INFORMATION  Has property been privately appraised? Yes  If appraised within one year, submit copy to the Board  Purchase Price of Property \$ 184,500  Date of Purchase August 30, 1993  Outstanding Loans on Property  \$ 134,000 Amount 30 yr Terms 7.0% Interest  Rate
7.	STATE THE JUSTIFICATION FOR YOUR APPEAL  Both the appraisal at \$190,000	) and the sales price, 184500, are
	well below the assessment prop 319 D Street, SE continue that	cosal for 1995. Recent sales, such as trend. That house, a 3 story, 3 bed-

	Property Description & Analysis	UNIFORM RESIDE	ENTIAL APPRA	ISAL RE	∵∪RT	File No00	72893.06W
L	Property Address 418 D STREET S.1		Census Trac	65.0	21	LENDER DISCRETI	ONARY USE
4.7	City WASHINGTON D.C. County	State	e Zip Code	20003		Sale Price \$	
	Legal Description SQUARE: 820, LOT	Γ: 32				Date	
UBJECT	Owner/Occupant MCMILLAN		Map Refere	ence 16_E	5_	Mortgage Amount \$	
Ħ	Sale Price \$ REFINANCE Date of Sale 1	N/A	PROP	ERTY RIGH	TS APPRAISED	Mortgage Type	
E	Loan charges/concessions to be paid by selle	r \$ N O N E	X	Fee Simple	ľ	Discount Points and C	Other Concessions
7	R.E. Taxes \$ 3,527.62 Tax Year 9	93-94 HOA \$/Mo.	NONE	Leasehold		Paid By Seller \$	
	Lender/Client MORGAN HOME FUNDING	G/MONTGOMERY VIL	LLAGE, MD	Condominiu	ے (AV/DUH) mد		
	WALLACE APPRAISAL (301)593-	-8600		De Minimis	PUD	Source	
	LOCATION X Urban	Suburban	Rural	N	IEIGHBORHOO		ood Avg. Fair Poor
	BUILT UP X Over 75%	<b>25-75</b> %	Under 25%	E	mployment Stal		
•. 2	GROWTH RATE Rapid	X Stable	Slow	, c	Convenience to E		
1	PROPERTY VALUES  Increasing	X Stable	Declining		Convenience to S		
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4	MARKETING TIME Under 3 Mos.		Over 6 Mos.		dequacy of Pub	•	
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0		OCCUPANCY	PRICE	1	dequacy of Utili		
	2-4 Family 15 Likely	Owner	T ()	_`` '	roperty Compat		
-	,	ال Tenant ال		4.0.5			
피	Commercial To:				olice & Fire Pro		
2	Industrial1 Vacant	Vacant (over 5%)	Predominar		ieneral Appeara ppeal to Market	•	
4.			<del></del>				
	Note: Race or the racial composition of the ne COMMENTS: SUBJECT IS LOCATED					HFAST WASHIN	CTON D C
ě.	SUBJECT IS BOUND SOUTH OF	_					
	SOUTH CAPITOL STREET S.E.						<u> </u>
ŀ							
	Dimensions 75 X 17				Topography	LEVEL	
-	Site Area 1,238 SQ.FT.	Corner	Lot NO		Size	TYPICAL	FOR AREA
	Zoning Classification RESIDENTIAL R-4	Zoning	Compliance YES		Shape	RECTANG	ULAR
	HIGHEST & BEST USE: Present Use YES	_	Jse NONE		Drainage	ADEQUAT	E
	UTILITIES Public Other SIT	TE IMPROVEMENTS T	Гуре Publi	c Private	View	TYPICAL	FOR AREA
1		eet MACADAM	X		Landscaping	TYPICAL	
7,		rb/Gutter <u>CONCRETE</u>			Driveway	NONE	
		lewalk <u>CONCRETE</u>			Apparent Ease	ments <u>USUAL</u>	
		eet Lights POLE	X		FEMA Flood H	azard Yes*	No <u>X</u>
	Storm Sewer X Alle	ey NONE		$\Box$	FEMA* Map/Zo	one 110001-	0030 B 11/85

	Property Description & Analysis	UNIFORM RESIDE	NTIAL APPRAISAL RE	: ∵URT	File No0072893.06W
į,	Property Address 418 D STREET S.		Census Tract 65.	21	LENDER DISCRETIONARY USE
Arthur Le	City WASHINGTON D.C. County	State	Zip Code 2000	3	Sale Price \$
		T: 32			Date
BUECH	Owner/Occupant MCMILLAN		Map Reference 16	E 5	Mortgage Amount\$
	Sale Price \$ REFINANCE Date of Sale 1	N/A	PROPERTY RIGH	ITS APPRAISED	Mortgage Type
F,	Loan charges/concessions to be paid by selle	er \$NONE	X Fee Simple	Э	Discount Points and Other Concessions
	R.E. Taxes \$ 3 , 527 . 62 Tax Year 9	93-94 HOA \$/Mo.	NONE Leasehold		Paid By Seller \$
	Lender/Client MORGAN HOME FUNDING	G/MONTGOMERY VIL	LAGE, MD Condomin	ium (HUD/VA)	
	WALLACE APPRAISAL (301)593-	-8600	De Minimis	PUD	Source
1	LOCATION X Urban	Suburban	Rural	NEIGHBORHOC	
	BUILT UP X Over 75%	<b>25-75</b> %	Under 25%	Employment Sta	
÷.	GROWTH RATE Rapid	X Stable	Slow	Convenience to	
ř.	PROPERTY VALUES Increasing	X Stable	Declining	Convenience to	
	DEMAND/SUPPLY	X In Balance		Convenience to	
1	MARKETING TIME Under 3 Mos.	X 3-6 Mos.	Over 6 Mos.	Adequacy of Pu	blic Transportation 🗵 🔲 🔲 📗
000	PRESENT LAND USE% LAND USE CHANGE	PREDOMINANT	SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING	Recreation Facili	
ė	Single Family <u>70</u> Not Likely	OCCUPANCY	PRICE AGE	Adequacy of Util	
	2-4 Family <u>15</u> Likely	Owner		Property Compa	
0	Multi-family 15 In Process	- 1 1 0 1 d 1 d 1 d 1		Protection from I	Detrimental Cond. X
गंडाता	Commercial To:	一 , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		Police & Fire Pro	
Ë		Vacant (over 5%)			ance of Properties X
	Vacant			Appeal to Marke	t X T
	Note: Race or the racial composition of the ne				
4	COMMENTS: SUBJECT IS LOCATED				
	SUBJECT IS BOUND SOUTH OF I				
	SOUTH CAPITOL STREET S.E.	SUBJECT HAS GOO	D ACCESS TO ALL C	UMMUNITY S	ERVICES.
	DE V 48				* DVD*
	Dimensions 75 X 17	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Topography	LEVEL
	Sile Area 1,238 SQ.FT.	Corner L		Size	TYPICAL FOR AREA
	Zoning Classification RESIDENTIAL R-4		Compliance YES	Shape	RECTANGULAR
	HIGHEST & BEST USE: Present Use YES		se NONE	Drainage	ADEQUATE -
			уре Public Private	1	TYPICAL FOR AREA
-		eet MACADAM		Landscaping	TYPICAL
Ţ		rb/Gutter CONCRETE		Driveway	NONE
		dewalk <u>CONCRETE</u>		Apparent Ease	
		cer agins <u></u>		FEMA Flood H	
	Storm Sewer X Alle	BY NUME		FEMA* Map/Z	one 110001-0030 B 11/85